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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE' 
Amici seek to ensure equity remains a viable 
enforcement tool for courts to fulfill the statutory 
purposes embodied in the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) and other environmental laws. If 
Petitioners' view prevails, amici fear courts will 
foreclose injunctive relief unless environmental harms 
are proven more likely than not to occur, an unmerited 
departure from equity's traditional role. For these 
reasons, two former General Counsels to the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) and seven law professors 
submit this amicus curiae brief in support of 
Respondents Geertson Seed Farms, et al. 
Amici Dinah Bear and Gary Widman are former 
General Counsels to CEQ in the Executive Office of the 
President whose service extends throughout much of 
the lifetime of NEPA' Their combined experience 
interpreting and implementing NEPA spans five 
presidential administrations. Ms. Bear and Mr. 
Widman remain strongly committed to promoting 
NEPA's faithful enforcement. 
Amici Robert Glicksman, Oliver Houck, Daniel 
Mandelker, Thomas McGarity, Robert Percival, 
Zygmunt Plater, and Nicholas Robinson are law 
I Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3, the parties have 
consented to the ftling of this brief, and letters of consent have 
been filed with the Clerk of this Court. Pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 37.6, amici state that no counsel for any party in this 
case authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person or 
entity other than amici and their counsel has made a monetary 
contribution to the preparation and submission of this brief. 
1 More detailed biographies of amici former General Counsels to 
CEQ are included in Appendix A. 
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professors from across the United States, each of whom 
has taught environmental, natural resources, and 
administrative law in excess of twenty years-in one 
case for over fIfty years.3 Their vast scholarship 
includes over two hundred law review articles, six 
casebooks, and the leading treatise on NEPA law. 
Although law professors often write about what law 
should be established, here they write to defend law 
that is already well-established. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
District courts have broad discretion to tailor 
remedies to the circumstances of the case, and 
appellate courts should not, and historically have not, 
lightly cast aside the reasoned judgment made by the 
judge who has weighed the facts and balanced the 
equities fIrst hand. Petitioners have not shown that 
the district court's fmdings of fact, taken largely from 
the administrative record, were clearly erroneous. 
Releasing Roundup Ready alfalfa into the environment 
without completing an environmental analysis would 
have exposed Respondents to a real and immediate 
threat of biological contamination, an environmental 
injury that is irreparable. Equitable relief does not 
require plaintiffs to show a near-certainty of 
irreparable harm, which amounts to a virtually 
impossible standard for future injuries. Indeed, courts 
have traditionally exercised their discretion to issue 
injunctions that avoid future harm where there is a 
real and immediate threat of harm. 
3 More detailed biographies of amici law professors are included in 
Appendix A. 
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By enforcing the statutory procedures of the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). the district 
court respected the deliberately expressed judgment of 
Congress. As this Court recognized in Tennessee Valley 
Authority u. Hill . 437 U.S. 153 (1978), while equity 
courts enjoy broad discretion, that discretion does not 
extend so far as to give district courts authority to 
ignore a statute's principal objectives. Although the 
district court did not have an absolute duty to issue the 
injunction, the district court did not abuse its discretion 
by declining to issue the injunction proposed by the 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). 
Aiter balancing the four equity factors, the remedy 
chosen by the district court preserved the opportunity 
for APHIS to comply with NEPA's twin aims of 
informed decisionmaking and public participation. 
Moreover, APHIS's proposed injunction would have 
undermined these two objectives by allowing APHIS to 
implement a decision first and then analyze it later. 
ARGUMENT 
Monsanto Company's petition to deregulate 
Roundup Ready alfalfa has not satisfied the procedural 
requirements Congress imposed before a potential 
"plant pest" can be released into the environment. In 
this case, the Plant Protection Act (PPA) defines the 
status quo: regulated plants, including genetically 
modified plants. cannot be released into the 
environment without a permit. 7 U.S.C. § 7712; 7 
C.F. R. § 340.0(a)(2) n.l. Genetically modified plants 
can be deregulated, but a decision to deregulate must 
include an environmental analysis in compliance with 
NEPA, which requires agencies to disclose and analyze 
the full range of reasonably foreseeable environmental 
4 
impacts before implementing a decision that 
irreversibly or irretrievably commits resources to a 
course of action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); 7 C.F.R. 
§ 372.5(b)(4). To comply with NEPA, APHIS's 
regulations require "early and adequate consideration 
of environmental factors in [APHIS's] planning and 
decisionmaking." 7 C.F.R. § 372.L 
Past examples of ecological devastation wrought 
by the unwitting introduction of plant and animal pests 
into the environment illustrate the wisdom of 
prohibiting the commercial sale and widespread 
distribution of genetically modified plants until APHIS 
finishes its NEPA analysis and concludes that the 
newly created plants are not "plant pests." See 7 
U.S.C. § 7711(a); 7 C.F.R. § 340.0(a)(2) n.L ''There are 
reasons for believing (the experience with the 
introduction of non-native species) is pertinent to the 
assessment of risks associated with the deliberate 
release of organisms that have been modified by 
engineering." William H. Rodgers, Jr., Rodgers' 
Environmental Law § 6:12 (A) (Supp. 2009). Yet, 
Monsanto Company and its licensee Forage Genetics 
(collectively "Monsanto"), argue that the district court 
abused its discretion by rejecting a proposed injunction 
that would allow Roundup Ready alfalfa to be released 
into the environment on a commercial scale before 
APHIS finishes its NEPA analysis. However, APHIS's 
flawed NEPA analysis failed to analyze specific, 
threatened environmental harms, like biological 
contamination and the development of glyphosate-
resistant weeds. Therefore, the district court's decision 
to preserve the status quo while APHIS corrected its 
errors was not an abuse of discretion. 
o 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S INJUNCTION 
BALANCED THE INTERESTS OF THE 
PARTIES WHILE ENFORCING THE 
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF 
NEPAAND PPA. 
The characteristics of flexibility and practicality 
allow courts in equity to tailor remedies to the 
circumstances of the individual case. See Hecht Co. v. 
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) ("Flexibility rather 
than rigidity" distinguishes equity jurisdiction.). 
Appellate courts do not lightly cast aside the factual 
findings or the equitable balances reached by district 
courts. They reject factual findings only where they 
are clearly erroneous and upset the balance struck by 
the district court only where there has been an abuse of 
discretion. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 
U.S. 388, 391 (2006); see Found. on Econ. Trends v. 
Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 151·52 (D.C. Cir. 1985). These 
standards of review are fundamental, and yet they are 
conspicuously absent from Petitioners' brief. 
Petitioners attempt to dodge these highly deferential 
standards by attacking the district court's decision on 
novel legal grounds, asserting error in the standard for 
irreparable harm and in the evidentiary procedures 
used by the district court. Though Petitioners disagree 
with the balance struck by the district court, they have 
not shown that the findings of fact , taken largely from 
the administrative record, were clearly erroneous. Nor 
have they shown that the balance reached, after the 
court carefully applied the traditional four· factor test 
and weighed the equities between the parties, was an 
abuse of discretion. 
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A. The risk of cross-contaminatioD 
caused by releasing Roundup Ready 
alfalfa created a likelihood of 
irreparable harm that justified 
injunctive relief. 
Injunctive relief. by definition, is forward-
looking. Doug/as v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 165 
(1943). Thus, equity has traditionally sheltered 
plaintiffs from real threats of future wrongs that 
imperiled the plaintiffs' interests. See, e.g., United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. United States, 361 U.S. 39,40·42 
(1959) (enjoining strike because, if the strike continued, 
it would create further delay in steel production, and 
delay would imperil national health and safety); 42 
Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 2 (Supp. 2010) ("Injunctive 
relief is designed to meet a real threat of a future 
wrong or a contemporary wrong of a nature likely to 
continue or recur."); see also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 
U.S. 488, 496 (1974) ("[PJast wrongs are evidence 
bearing on whether there is a real and immediate 
threat . .. . "). 
Though equity sometimes remedies present 
harm, its principal remedial effect is prospective, 
guarding against future harm despite the future's 
inherent uncertainty. See United States u. W. T. Grant 
Co. , 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) ("The purpose of an 
injunction is to prevent future violations .. . . "); United 
States v. Or. State Med. Socy, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952) 
(,'The sole function of an action for injunction is to 
forestall future violations."). Equitable relief has 
guarded a village against dam failure, obtained 
treatment for orphans at risk for neurological illness, 
and even ensured that the Seattle Supersonics had 
their star basketball player, Spencer Haywood, for the 
7 
upcoming NBA playoffs. See Warm Springs Dam Task 
Force u. Gribble, 417 U.S. 1301 (Douglas, Circuit 
Justice 1974); Friends for All Children, Inc. u. Lockheed 
Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Haywood 
u. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1971), 
respectively. 
The extent to which the threat of future harm 
imperils the plaintiffs interest, i.e., the significance of 
the risk, has always been a question for the trial court's 
equitable discretion. For example, commentators agree 
that a lower probability of an extremely grave 
irreparable harm may entitle a plaintiff to injunctive 
relief where the same probability of a more minor 
irreparable harm would not. See llA Charles Allen 
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 2948 (2d ed. 1982) (courts should consider 
"the significance of the threat of irreparable harm" 
(emphasis added)}; see generally Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 933(1} (1979), cmt. b (,'The more serious the 
impending harm, the less justification there is for 
taking the chances that are involved in pronouncing 
the harm too remote.") ; eass R. Sunstein, Irreversible 
and Catastrophic, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 841, 870 (2006) 
(noting that a one-in-a-million chance that 200 million 
people will die and a fifty-fifty chance that 400 people 
will die both create an expected cost of 200 lives). 
Risk is not harmless simply because the threat of 
harm is not certain. See United States v. Carroll 
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) 
(establishing B<PL test for negligence liability that 
considered the probability of future harm, i.e. , risk). 
This Court noted over one hundred years ago that 
federal courts can use their equitable powers to 
"prevent nuisances that are threatened, and before 
• 
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irreparable mischief ensues . . . and, by perpetual 
injunction, protect the public against them in the 
future." Mugler u. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 673 (1887). 
The law of anticipatory nuisance, for instance, offers 
relief from prospective harm caused by a future 
nuisance. even in the absence of past or present injury. 
Plaintiffs need not prove they have already been 
harmed, because "even threatened harm is actionable 
under the federal common law of nuisance." 
Connecticut u. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d 309, 357 (2d 
Cir.2009). 
In light of this precedent, it was hardly novel, 
much less an abuse of discretion, for the district court 
to issue an injunction guarding against the future 
irreparable harm of biological contamination where the 
record established that the risk was "sufficiently 
likely." Amoco Prod. Co. u. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 
531, 545 (1987). Indeed, the facts before the district 
court showed that this standard had been surpassed 
because biological contamination had already occurred. 
Pet.App. 13a, 61a. As the district court explained, 
biological contamination from cross· pollination between 
Roundup Ready alfalfa and organic alfalfa is 
irreparable because "[t]he contamination cannot be 
undone; it will destroy the crops of those farmers who 
do not sell genetically engineered alfalfa. Moreover, it 
is not a one season loss; alfalfa is a perennial crop and 
once removed cannot be replanted for two to four 
years." Pet.App. 71a. Once a conventional alfalfa 
farmer's seed crop is contaminated, "there is no way for 
the farmer to remove the gene from the crop or control 
its further spread." Pet.App. 36a. Therefore, Judge 
Breyer's conclusion that irreversible genetic 
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contamination of conventional alfalfa crops was 
irreparable harm was not clearly erroneous. 
In addition to confirming irreparable harm, the 
record amply supports Judge Breyer's finding that 
biological contamination could occur, establishing a 
'1ikelihood" of irreparable injury. It is undisputed that 
cross-contamination could occur, and has occurred. 
Pet.App. 61a ("APHIS acknowledged that gene 
transmission could and had occurred with Roundup 
Ready alfalfa."). APHIS's environmental assessment 
acknowledged this risk and even analyzed the 
possibility that gene transmission could eradicate all 
other strains of alfalfa. Pet.App. 42a·43a.' It is also 
undisputed that glyphosate-resistant weeds could 
develop. Pet.App. 45a·46a. Finally, it is undisputed 
that Roundup Ready alfalfa has been made 
commercially available and that, absent an injunction, 
its use would increase. See Pet.App. 64a. In addition 
to these undisputed facts, the district court made 
further factual findings. "IGJene transmission is 
especially likely in this context given the geographic 
concentration of alfalfa seed production." Pet.App. 35a-
36a (emphasis added). Thus, the district court's 
4 Petitioners take issue with the district court's "suggestion that 
continued planting of (Roundup Ready alfalfa] could ~liminate the 
availability of conventional alfalfa." Pet. Br. 34. This 
"suggestion," however, came from APHIS, not from the district 
court. The possibility that gene transmission could eliminate the 
ability to grow non-genetically engineered alfalfa is the reason 
that APHIS analyzed the economic impacts that elimination of 
organic or conventional alfalfa crops would have on farmers. 
Pet.App. 44a-45a. Additionally. an internal APHIS email 
acknowledged that "it may be hard to guarantee that seeds or 
sprouts are GE free." Pet.App.38a. 
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conclusion that cross-contamination was sufficiently 
likely was not clearly erroneous. 
Though the record demonstrates that the district 
court found a likelihood, not just a possibility, of 
irreparable harm, Petitioners attack the court's legal 
standard for irreparable harm by distorting the 
language of the court's order. Throughout their brief, 
Petitioners suggest that the district court's use of the 
phrase "sufficiently likely" indicates that the court 
applied an inappropriate "mere 'possibility'" standard. 
Pet. Br. 19, 21, 41, 44. Yet "sufficiently likely" is 
neither a lenient standard imposed by the Ninth 
Circuit nor a radical invention of the district court: it 
was this Court's own description of the proper standard 
for the issuance of an injunction. See Amoco, 480 U.S. 
at 545 ("If such injury is sufficiently likely, therefore, 
the balance of harms will usually favor the issuance of 
an injunction to protect the environment."). Nowhere 
did the district court suggest that the mere possibility 
of cross-pollination entitled the plaintiffs to an 
lnJunction. If the court had applied a possibility 
standard, it would not have needed a ten-page 
memorandum to explain the justification for its 
permanent injunction; a short order citing to APHIS's 
environmental assessment-record evidence that 
acknowledges (at a minimum) the possibility of gene 
transmission-would have sufficed. Pet.App. 45a. 
Instead, the district court went much further, weighing 
the facts and concluding that, in light of the close 
geographic distribution of alfalfa crops and the fact 
that gene transmission had already occurred, biological 
contamination was sufficiently likely to occur under 
APHIS's proposed injunction. See, e.g. , Pet.App. 61a, 
70a, 71a; Pet.App. lOa, 13a. 
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The Petitioners' misguided articulation of the 
"likelihood" of irreparable harm standard stems from 
their misreading of this Court's opinion in Winter u. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365 
(2008), which they claim requires a near-certainty of 
irreparable harm-a standard that would make a 
forward-looking injunction nearly impossible. This 
Court has never countenanced such a standard. 
Indeed, although this Court has characterized the 
likelihood standard slightly differently over the years, 
the standard itself has never changed; it remains part 
of the same equitable balancing test ''historically 
employed by courts of equity." eBay, 547 U.S. at 390. 
Compare Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 375 ("liIlely''), with 
Amoco, 480 U.S. at 545 ("sufficiently likely") , with City 
of Los Angeles u. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) 
("likelihood"), and O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 502 (same), with 
W. T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 633 ("cognizable danger ... 
something more than the mere possibility"). 
Equity has never required a showing that 
irreparable harm is more likely than not, and 
Petitioners cite no case establishing such a bright line. 
Several federal courts of appeals have interpreted this 
Court's various descriptions of "likelihood" to mean 
"significant risk," but there is no flXed line separating 
significant risks from speculative ones. See Greater 
Yellowstone Coal. u. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1258 (10th 
Cir. 2003) ("[AJn injury is not speculative simply 
because it is not certain to occur."); Adams u. Freedom 
Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484·85 (3d Cir. 2000) (,'The 
irreparable harm requirement is met if a plaintiff 
demonstrates a significant risk that he or she will 
experience harm that cannot adequately be 
compensated after the fact by monetary damages."); 
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Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal. , Inc. u. Coal. for Econ. 
Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[Tlhe 
party seeking the injunction must demonstrate that it 
will be exposed to some significant risk of irreparable 
injury."). 
B. A new and unanalyzed activity can 
create a sufficient likelihood of 
irreparable harm. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion by 
rejecting an injunction that would have radically 
altered the status quo before APHIS completed the 
environmental analysis. APHIS's proposed injunctive 
relief would have authorized exponential expansion of 
Roundup Ready alfalfa production nationwide, 
increasing the number of acres planted by five-fold in 
less than a year. Pet.App. 64a. The district court 
properly refused to endorse such dramatic growth of a 
new and unanalyzed activity. especially when it found 
biological contamination had already occurred under 
planting conditions similar to those proposed in 
APHIS's injunction. Pet.App. 70a. Neither 
information gathered through analysis nor experience 
supports APHIS's assertion that its injunctive 
measures would avoid biological contamination. 
A court is well within its equitable discretion to 
enjoin an unprecedented activity from proceeding until 
after a proper environmental analysis, required by 
statute, has been conducted. See Found. on Econ. 
Trends, 756 F.2d at 157. In Sierra Club u. Marsh, 
then-Judge, now-Justice, Breyer noted that the "added 
risk to the environment that takes place when 
governmental decisionmakers make up their minds 
without having before them an analysis (with prior 
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public comment) of the likely effects of their decision 
upon the environment" can create irreparable harm. 
872 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1989); see also 
Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952 (1st Cir. 
1983) (Breyer, J.). 
In Foundation on Economic Trends, the D.C. 
Circuit upheld an injunction stopping the National 
Institute of Health (NIH) from releasing new 
genetically engineered bacteria into the environment 
until after it completed an adequate NEPA analysis. 
756 F.2d at 150. With reasoning remarkably similar to 
that advanced by Petitioners in this case, NIH 
acknowledged that the engineered bacteria could 
multiply and disperse throughout the environment, but 
argued that the likelihood of dispersion was low and, 
therefore, did not analyze whether dispersion would 
cause environmental injury. l d . at 153. Due to NIH's 
"complete failure to address a major environmental 
concern" before authorizing an unprecedented activity 
that threatened environmental harm, id. at 154, the 
D.C. Circuit upheld the injunction delaying the 
proposed experiment.S In contrast, In Winter, 
& The district court actually enjoined two activities: (1) 8. specific 
approval of the deliberate release of genetically modified 
organisms; and (2) a policy change authorizing direct release 
experiments. The D.C. Circuit upheld the injunction regarding 
the fust activity, but concluded that the second injunction was 
"overly broadn in part because the regulations did not make direct 
release "an imminent possibility." Found. on Econ. Trends , 756 
F.2d at 158. This result reflects the power of equity courts to 
shape a remedy that can fulml the objectives of NEPA without 
adversely affecting society by issuing an overly broad injunction. 
See Wisconsin [). Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 426 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(where NEPA violation was uncertain, and the only threatened 
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experience weighed against the issuance of an 
injunction where the Navy had not yet done a NEPA 
analysis for training exercises that had been "taking 
place in SOCAL for the last 40 years." See Winter, 129 
S. Ct. at 376. In declining to issue an injunction, this 
Court found it llpertinent" that the Navy was not 
"conducting a new type of activity with completely 
unknown effects on the environment." Id. 
In this case, Petitioners cannot rely on either 
analysis or experience to demonstrate that APHIS's 
proposed m)unction would truly guard against 
irreparable biological contamination. Pet.App. 69a-70a 
("[Defendants] have not submitted any evidence that 
suggests whether, and to what extent, the proposed 
interim conditions will be followed, even though such 
conditions are similar to those already imposed by 
Forage Genetics in its contracts with Roundup Ready 
seed growers and contamination has occurred despite 
these conditions."). 
This is not a case where the lack of information 
is an injury that is suffered by all and so actionable by 
none. Cr. Allen v. Wright , 468 U.S. 737, 751, 760 (1984) 
(summarizing prior line of cases as representing the 
principle that "absent an allegation of a specific threat 
of being subject to the challenged practices, plaintiffs 
had no standing to ask for an injunction"). To the 
contrary, traditional seed farmers need the information 
missing from the environmental assessment to protect 
their crops from biological contamination-even if 
Roundup Ready alfalfa is only partially deregulated. 
APHIS summarily concluded that biological 
injury was agency preference for a particular course of action, an 
injunction was unwarranted} . 
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contamination was "highly unlikely" if growers used 
"quality control," but the agency did not explain or 
identify any quality control measures that would 
prevent gene transmission between neighboring seed 
farms, nor did it analyze the burden that such 
measures would impose on farmers of conventional 
alfalfa. Pet.App. 31a, 41a. The informational injury 
here is particularized and consequential, and it created 
a sufficient likelihood of irreparable harm. Therefore, 
the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
delaying APHIS's foray into "uncharted territory," 
Pet.App. 45a, by requiring APHIS to finish a 
meaningful NEPA analysis before deregulating 
Roundup Ready alfalfa. 
C. The district court thoroughly 
balanced the equities in accordance 
with the traditional four-part test for 
injunctive relief. 
Petitioners' assertion that the district court 
applied a "special rule" for NEPA cases instead of 
balancing the four traditional factors is not supported 
by the court's decision. As discussed thoroughly above, 
Judge Breyer concluded that the risk of biological 
contamination caused by increasing the amount of 
Roundup Ready alfalfa in the environment created a 
sufficiently likely threat of irreparable harm. Judge 
Breyer found that the balance of hardships favored 
issuing an injunction because any harm to Monsanto 
would be purely economic and would "not outweigh the 
potential irreparable damage to the environment ." 
Pet.App. 72a (internal citation omitted). Additionally, 
in light of NEPA's statutory purpose, Judge Breyer 
found it "in the public interest to delay the further 
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introduction of Roundup Ready alfalfa into the 
environment while APHIS studies the environmental 
consequences of such action." Pet.App. 75a. Finally, he 
explicitly concluded that "plaintiffs have sufficiently 
established irreparable injury and that the balance of 
the equities weighs in favor of maintenance of the 
status quo and against allowing the continued 
expansion" of Roundup Ready alfalfa during completion 
of the ErS. Pet.App. 7la. 
As the arbiter who placed the weights upon the 
scales, Judge Breyer was best positioned to eye the 
balance. His judgment was not an abuse of discretion, 
and is, therefore, entitled to deference. See eBay. 547 
U.S. at 391. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S INJUNCTION 
RESPECTED THE WILL OF CONGRESS 
BY ENFORCING NEPA'S STATUTORY 
PROCEDURES AND POLICIES. 
Although courts in equity have broad discretion 
to fashion a remedy, their discretion is not so broad 
that they can refuse to enforce a statutory scheme. The 
choice before courts sitting in equity is "whether a 
particular means of enforcing the statute should be 
chosen over another permissible means; their choice is 
not whether enforcement is preferable to no 
enforcement at all." United States v. Oakland 
Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 497·98 (2001). 
"[Al court sitting in equity cannot 'ignore the judgment 
of Congress, deliberately expressed in legislation."' Id. 
at 497 (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 
300 U.S. 515, 551 (1937». Although district courts 
enjoy "sound discretion" to tailor injunctive relief to the 
"necessities of the public interest," in the statutory 
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context, Congress dermes the public interest. Hecht Co. 
v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329·31 (1944). ' These 
principles do not change when applied to NEPA. 
With NEPA, Congress prioritized foresight, 
planning, and analysis as antidotes to "new and 
expanding technological advances" that could 
profoundly affect the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a). 
"Once Congress ... has decided the order of priorities 
in a given area, it is for the Executive to administer the 
6 To be sure, there are cases in which this Court has concluded 
that a statutory violation did not require an injunction. See, e,g., 
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987); 
Weinberger u. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) ; Hecht Co. u. 
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944). However. these cases illustrate, 
rather than undermine, the strength of the principle that courts 
exercise their equitable discretion in light of the large objectives of 
the statutory scheme and do not have discretion to authorize 
behavior that Congress intended to prohibit. See generally 
Zygmunt B. Plater, Statutory Violatwns and Equitable Discretwn, 
70 Cal. L. Rev. 524, passim (1982) . In Amoco, the large objectives 
of the statute were designed to protect subsistence resources. and 
the district court expressly found that exploration activities would 
not significantly restrict subsistence uses. 480 U.S. at 544. 
Therefore, an injunction requiring statutory compliance was not 
required. Similarly, in Weinberger, this Court concluded that the 
Navy's training sessions off the coast of Puerto Rico, resulting in 
"accidental bombings of the navigable waters," did not undermine 
the statutory purpose of the Clean Water Act because "the 
discharge of ordnance had not polluted the waters." 456 U.s. at 
307, 315. Therefore, "[a]n injunction [was] not the only means of 
ensuring compliance" with the large objectives of the Clean Water 
Act. ld. at 314. Finally, in Hecht , this Court concluded that an 
injunction was not mandatory because statutory compliance was 
already assured. 321 U.S. at 326. In this case, however, as 
explained more thoroughly in this section, the district court could 
not have entered APHIS's proposed injunction and still have 
fulfiUed the statutory objectives of NEPA; informed 
decisionmaking and public participation. 
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laws and for courts to enforce them when enforcement 
is sought." TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978). 
APHIS's proposed injunction would have overridden 
the procedural safeguards that Congress imposed 
through NEPA against rash decisions that could have 
significant environmental impacts. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(2)(C). Therefore, the district court did not abuse 
its discretion when it rejected APHIS's proposal and 
chose to enforce NEPA's procedures .7 
7 Petitioners argue that NEPA's statutory objectives only protect 
"the environment" and "absent species-level harm there is no 
meaningful change in the environment." Pet . Bt. 36·37. This 
argument is fundamentally flawed. Congress specifically 
referenced localized harms by requiring environmental impact 
statements to include "the relationship between local short-term 
uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement 
of long-term productivity," 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iv) (emphasis 
added) . Petitioners' argument also ignores the fact that NEPA 
contextualizes the significance of environmental impacts. 40 
C.F.R. § 1508.27(a) \,[T]he significance of an action must be 
analyzed in several contexts such as society as a whole (human. 
national), the affected region. the affected interests, and the 
locality.") . 
Petitioners are also wrong to suggest that NEPA's statutory 
objectives only protect the environment, not individuals or people. 
Prior to the fmal passage of NEPA, Senator J ackson, one of 
NEPA's chief sponsors, articulated the relationship between 
humans and the environment from the Senate floor . "An 
environmental policy is a policy for people. Its primary concern is 
with man and his future." 115 Congo Rec. 40,416 (1969). 
Congress's declaration of national environmental policy supports 
Senator Jackson's statement. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) 
(declaring that "each person should enjoy a healthful environment" 
(emphasis added)); id. § 4331(b)(4) (stating that NEPA protects 
"an environment which supports diversity and variety of 
indivi.dual choice" (emphasis added». 
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"A court must exercise this [equitable discretion] 
'in light of the large objectives of the Act."' Albemarle 
Paper Co. u. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975) (quoting 
Hecht , 321 U.S. at 331). This Court has described 
NEPA's large objectives as the twin aims of informed 
decisionmaking and public participation. Dep't of 
Transp. u. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004); Bait. 
Gas & Elec. Co. u. Natural Res. De/. Council, Inc., 462 
U.S. 87, 97 (1983). Neither of these objectives would be 
satisfied by APHIS's proposed injunction, which would 
have timed the NEPA analysis to postdate the release 
of Roundup Ready alfalfa, authorized an uninformed 
agency decision, and substituted an evidentiary 
hearing for NEPA's public process. Had the district 
court allowed APHIS to shunt NEPA's procedures to 
the side, to be accomplished in the aftermath of a 
decision made-and implemented-it would have 
abused its discretion by adopting a remedy that 
undermined the procedural scheme Congress adopted 
to achieve NEPA's large objectives and would have 
substituted the "chancellor's clumsy foot for the rule of 
law ." Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 335 
(1982) (Stevens, J. , dissenting). 
A. To inform decisionmaking, 
analysis must be conducted 
decision is implemented. 
a NEPA 
before the 
The difference between the injunction that the 
district court adopted and the injunction APHIS 
proposed was timing: and timing is critical to enforcing 
NEPA's large objectives. The district court's injunction 
insured that the agency's NEPA analysis would precede 
the widespread, commercial dissemination of Roundup 
Ready alfalfa; while under APHIS's injunction, the 
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analysis would have postdated the release. The 
difference in timing between these two injunctions is 
the difference between enforcing and not enforcing 
NEPA's objectives, where the unanalyzed activity 
threatened environmental injury. APHIS's proposed 
injunction would have allowed the "continued and 
dramatic growth of the Roundup Ready alfalfa market." 
Pet.App. 64a. It could have authorized a five-fold 
increase in acreage planted before APHIS had gathered 
the missing information about how (and whether) 
biological contamination could be avoided. Pet.App. 
64a. In other words, APHIS's injunction would have 
allowed the agency to implement a decision and 
analyze it later. 
Because this approach stands NEPA on its head, 
the district court was well within its discretion to issue 
an injunction. Under NEPA, agencies must include a 
"detailed statement" on the environmental impacts of 
every proposed (not implemented) action significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment and 
compile a description of adverse environmental impacts 
that cannot be avoided if the proposal is implemented. 
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); see 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b). 
NEPA is not about data gathering for the sake of 
gathering data; rather, it should inform a proposed 
agency action. Environmental impact statements 
should be useful analytic documents that promote 
informed decisionmaking, not tomes filled with 
information, gathering dust on a shelf. See 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1502.2(a) ("Environmental impact statements shall 
be analytic rather than encyclopedic."). NEPA is all 
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about informed decisionmaking. To accomplish this 
purpose, the process must precede the decision.s 
The district court's injunction also preserved 
APHIS's ability to choose among reasonable 
alternatives prior to taking action on Monsanto's 
request for deregulation. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (agencies 
should "[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate" 
all reasonable alternatives including a "no action" 
alternative). In contrast, like squeezing a tube of 
toothpaste, APHIS's injunction would have foreclosed 
the "no action" alternative by releasing Roundup Ready 
alfalfa into the environment without a viable means of 
re-containing it. If the court had authorized APHIS's 
approach, it would have foreclosed the critical "no 
action" alternative of not deregulating at all, thereby 
allowing the agency to commit resources to a course of 
action before it completed its NEPA analysis. See 40 
C.F.R. § 1502.2(1) ("Agencies shall not commit 
resources prejudicing selection of alternatives before 
8 Of course, that does not mean that an injunction must issue in 
every NEPA case in which there is an analytical flaw. "The grant 
of jurisdiction to ensure compliance with a statute hardly suggests 
an absolute duty to do so under any and all circumstances, and a 
federal judge sitting as a chancellor is not mechanically obligated 
to grant an injunction for every violation of law:' Weinberger , 456 
U.S. at 313. Whether the agency can still make an informed 
decision despite a NEPA violation is a fact -specific inquiry better 
suited to individual cases rather than broad generalizations. 
NEPA's procedural requirements '''ensur[e] that the agency, in 
reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully 
consider, detailed information concerning significant 
environmental impacts.'" Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376 (quoting 
Robertson u. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 
(1989)) . 
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making a fmal decision" ); see also id. § 1506.1(a)(2) 
("Until an agency issues a record of decision . . . no 
action concerning the proposal shall be taken which 
would [lJimit the choice of reasonable 
alternatives."). 
The bottom line is this: NEPA documents should 
not justify decisions already made. [d. § 1502.2(g). But 
that is precisely what APHIS's EIS would have done if 
the district court had adopted an injunction allowing 
further release of Roundup Ready alfalfa into the 
environment before the EIS was completed. 
By rejecting APHIS's injunction, and prohibiting 
further Roundup Ready alfalfa plantings or sales, the 
district court preserved the opportunity for APHIS to 
comply with NEPA, and thereby required APHIS to 
"abide by the limitations prescribed by the 
Legislature." Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842. 
892 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
B. APHIS's proposed injunction would have 
undermined NEPA's requirement that 
environmental analyses inform agency 
decisions. 
The complete deregulation of Roundup Ready 
alfalfa will destroy the livelihoods of conventional and 
organic alfalfa farmers and generate Roundup-resistant 
superweeds. See JA 109, 111, 135 (comments 
submitted to APHIS); see JA 678-79 (declaration). 
The complete deregulation of Roundup Ready 
alfalfa will create a negligible risk of cross-pollination 
and will have no significant impact on the emergence of 
Roundup-resistant superweeds. See Pet.App. 160a, 
401a (declarations). 
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The respective accuracy of each of these over-
simplified positions (and all possibilities in between) is 
unknown because APHIS's NEPA analysis failed to 
take a hard look at these and other potentially 
irreversible environmental impacts prtor to 
deregulating Roundup Ready alfalfa. Without 
understanding the environmental impacts that 
threatened environmental harm, APHIS could not 
make an informed decision about releasing Roundup 
Ready alfalfa. 
NEPA reqUITes informed decisionmaking. 
Agencies must, "to the fullest extent possible," 
systematically integrate the natural and social sciences 
in planning and in decisionmaking. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(2)(A). However, here, numerous aspects of 
APHIS's environmental assessment revealed 
foreseeable, but unanalyzed, impacts that threatened 
environmental harm. For example, APHIS never 
analyzed the cumulative impact caused by a dramatic 
increase in the use of glyphosate as a fertilizer and the 
consequent possibility that Roundup-resistant weeds 
could develop. Pet.App. 47a. As the district court 
noted, other Roundup Ready crops, including corn and 
soybeans, have already been deregulated and more 
deregulation petitions are pending. Pet.App. 47a. 
Alfalfa is the fourth largest crop in the United States, 
the flrst large-scale perennial Roundup Ready crop, 
and the first crop in which APHIS acknowledged on the 
record that there is a chance of gene transmission. 
Pet.App. 27a, 45a, 47a. Adding it to the mix may have 
significant consequences for the quality of the human 
environment. Pet.App. 45a. Failure to investigate 
these cumulative impacts violated Congress's mandate 
that "all agencies of the Federal Government shall ... 
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[identify] the relationship between local short-term 
uses of man's environment and the maintenance and 
enhancement of long-term productivity." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(2)(C)(iv). 
APHIS also failed to analyze impacts on organic 
farmers, on export markets, and on the availability of 
non-genetically modified alfalfa. NEPA protects 
"historic, cultural and natural aspects of our national 
heritage," as well as "an environment which . supports 
diversity and variety of individual choice." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4331(b)(4). A federal action "that eliminates a 
farmer's choice to grow non~genetically engineered 
crops, or a consumer's choice to eat non-genetically 
engineered food," Pet.App. 44a, should have been 
thoroughly analyzed, particularly where it threatens 
environmental injury. In furtherance of Congress's 
policies set out in NEPA, APHIS must analyze these 
impacts before authorizing the planting of one million 
acres of Roundup Ready alfalfa. 
Reviewing courts should base their decisions on 
the administrative record and should not substitute 
their judgment for that of the agency. Citizens to 
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 
(1971). Where the administrative record is silent, 
district courts properly remand, rather than conduct 
fact-finding procedures in the first instance. As Chief 
Judge Friendly once noted. "preservation of the 
integrity of NEPA necessitates that the [agency] be 
required to follow the steps set forth in § 102 [42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332], even if it now seems likely that those steps will 
lead it to adhere to the present result." City of New 
York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, _00 (E.D .N.Y. 
1972). To do otherwise would shortcut the process that 
Congress committed in the rlIst instance to the 
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responsible federal agency. Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 
885, 891·92 (1st Cir. 1973). 
The district court properly recognized this 
principle when it refused to render an independent 
judgment about wbether APHIS's proposed conditions, 
not analyzed in the environmental assessment, 
eliminated the likelihood of environmental injury 
caused by cross-contamination. Pet.App. 67a. "To 
make the findings requested by defendants would 
require this Court to engage in precisely the same 
inquiry it concluded APHIS failed to do ... without the 
benefit of all the relevant data and, importantly, 
without the opportunity for and consideration of public 
comment." Pet.App. 68a. Far from violating due 
process, Pet. Br. 51, this approach respected Congress's 
unequivocal dictate that "the policies, regulations, and 
public laws of the United States shall be interpreted 
and administered in accordance with policies set forth 
in this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (emphasis added). 
Where, as here, the agency has failed to make an 
informed decision pursuant to NEPA's procedures, 
district courts cannot make up for the lapse by 
conducting an evidentiary hearing, as requested by 
Petitioners, and by deciding in the frrst instance the 
desirability of the proposed action. Far from an abuse 
of discretion, the judicial restraint exercised by the 
district court protected "the integrity of the fact·finding 
process mandated by Congress m 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(2)(C)." Jones, 477 F.2d at 892. 
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C. Conducting an evidentiary hearing to 
d ecide wheth e r Roundup Read y a lfalfa 
sh ould b e r eleased wit h out a NEPA 
analysis would have undermined NEPA's 
a im of public participation. 
The affidavits of experts proffered by APHIS and 
Monsanto on the effectiveness of APHIS's proposed 
injunctive measures cannot remedy APHIS's failure to 
analyze whether biological contamination was 
avoidable, as NEPA requires. See Pet.App. 66a-67a. 
"NEPA procedures must insure that environmental 
information is available to public officials and citizens 
before decisions are made and before actions are 
taken." 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b); see also id. § 1501.1(a); 
Dep't of Transp., 541 U.S. at 768 (Agencies must ''have 
available, and. . carefully consider, detailed 
information concerning significant environmental 
impacts" prior to taking any major federal action.). 
Monsanto and APHIS gathered the expert affidavits 
after APHIS made its deregulation decision, so they 
were divorced from the other features of a NEPA 
analysis, like the requirement to "study, develop, and 
describe appropriate alternatives ... in any proposal 
which involves unresolved conflicts." 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1501.2(c). 
The restrictions in APHIS's proposed injunction, 
based on expert affidavits. were not made available to 
the public. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b). Because the experts' 
affidavits were no substitute for the NEPA process, the 
district court properly rejected Monsanto's argument 
that these affidavits could change the balance of 
equities. Where Congress has established the public 
interest, as articulated in a statute's large objectives, 
courts should enforce that judgment, "[flor the 
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standards of the public interest not the requirements of 
private litigation measure the propriety and need for 
injunctive relief." See Hecht, 321 U.S. at 33l. 
By prohibiting further sale and distribution of 
Roundup Ready alfalfa, the district court followed 
Congress's directive that the "policies, regulations, and 
public laws of the United States shall be interpreted 
and administered in accordance with [NEPAJ." 42 
U.S.C. § 4332. This decision, far from an abuse of 
discretion, respected the priorities expressed by 
Congress in NEPA. See TVA, 437 U.S. at 194. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the court of appeals should be 
affirmed. 
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Appendix A 
FORMER GENERAL COUNSELS TO THE COUNCIL 
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
Dinah Bear is an attorney based in Washington, 
D.C. After briefly serving as deputy General Counsel, 
she served for twenty-three years as the General 
Counsel to the Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ), the environmental agency in the Executive 
Office of the President. CEQ's responsibilities include 
advising the President on environmental matters, 
overseeing federal agencies' implementation of NEPA, 
and coordinating interagency implementation of 
environmental law and policy. She has taught, and 
continues to teach, NEPA courses for numerous federal 
agencies, the American Law Institute, the American 
Bar Association, and the Nicholas School of the 
Environment at Duke University. She has chaired the 
American Bar Association's Standing Committee on 
Environmental Law and the District of Columbia Bar 
Association's Section on Environment and Natural 
Resources. 
Gary Widman served as the General Counsel to 
the CEQ in the administrations of Presidents Nixon 
and Ford, from 1974 through 1976. Before and after 
his time at CEQ, he was a Professor of Law at the 
University of California, Hastings College of the Law. 
He also served as Associate Solicitor for Conservation 
and Wildlife in the Department of the Interior during 
the Carter administration, as counsel to the 
Washington, D.C. office of the Fulbright & Jaworski 
law firm, as Director of the Office of Staff Attorneys for 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from 
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1985 to 1987, as an attorney with the San Francisco 
law fIrm of Bronson, Bronson, & McKinnon, and as 
Chief Counsel of the California State Department of 
Parks and Recreation. 
LAW PROFESSORS 
Robert Glicksman is the J .B. & Maurice C. 
Shapiro Professor of Environmental Law at George 
Washington University Law School, teaching in the 
fields of administrative, environmental, natural 
resources, and property law. He is an accomplished 
environmental and natural resources law scholar with 
over sixty book chapters and articles to his credit. He 
co-authored an environmental law casebook, 
Environmental Protection: Law and Policy; the 
casebook Administrative Law: Agency Action in 
Context ; a treatise, Public Natural Resources Law; a 
monograph, Risk Regulation at Risk: A Pragmatic 
Approach; and Modem Public Land Law in a Nutshell. 
Oliver Houck is Director of the Environmental 
Law Program and Professor of Law at Tulane 
University Law School. He teaches in the fields of 
environmental, natural resources, and criminal law. 
He previously served as General Counsel to and Vice-
President of the National Wildlife Federation. He has 
published widely on environmental, administrative, 
and constitutional law, including over forty book 
chapters and articles, and he is co-editor of a popular 
book on the history of environmental law, 
Environmental Law Stories. He remains an active 
participant in litigation involving biological diversity 
and consults with foreign governments on the 
development of their environmental laws. 
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